A brief essay, chiefly in narrative form,
Peter Ravn Rasmussen
Revised and reworked from what was originally a term paper written at the University of Copenhagen in spring 1996.
This is version 1.1, dated September 23, 1996.
This document is copyright © 1996 Peter Ravn Rasmussen.
The founding of the first Danish East India Company was based chiefly on hopes and ambitions that had been aroused by the enormous revenues produced by the initial ventures of the British and Dutch companies. At the same time, there was a desire upon the part of the Danish monarch to play a dominant role in contemporary world trade, a desire friv.today that was apparently not always wholeheartedly endorsed by the Danish merchants of the period.
In fact, the Danish trading venture proved to be without large or durable profits. The company itself lasted for only 34 years, and, throughout its existence, the company brought only seven cargoes of asiatic goods to Copenhagen.
In the following text, I will deal in a narrative fashion with the period from the founding of the Company in 1616 to its dissolution in 1650, and with the period from 1650 to the founding of the second Danish company, in 1670. This interval offers a multitude of events to illuminate the nature of the Danish adventurers' interaction with distant India. I will focus particularly on the events surrounding the founding of the Danish colony on the Coromandel coast of India, Tranquebar, in 1620, and on the Danish privateering activity in the Bay of Bengal, for three decades, starting around 1640. Subsequently, I will dwell somewhat on the different natures of the Danish, British and Dutch companies, and on the reasons for their success or failure.
2. Narrative: Tranquebar and the Danish company
2.1. Prelude to the Danish colonial period in Asia (1616 - 1620)
2.1.1. The British and Dutch companies
In the year 1600, Queen Elizabeth I of England took a decision that in the long term would change the structure of world commerce. Responding to the developing needs of British overseas trade, she issued a charter for the creation of what was to become the British East India Company (hereafter the EIC).
With the corresponding merger, in 1602, of the Dutch voor-compagnieën into the Dutch United East India Company (hereafter the VOC), the groundwork was laid for an expansion of European trade interests into the Asian hemisphere, an expansion that would have a significant effect on both hemispheres.
During the first decades of their existence, both companies made profits that by contemporary European standards (and, one might add, by modern-day standards, too) were enormous. For instance, the Seventh Voyage of the EIC, in 1611-1615, garnered a profit of 214 percent on an original investment of £15634 . These levels of profit could hardly help but enflame the desires of others. One person whose interest was aroused was King Christian IV, monarch of the dual kingdom of Denmark-Norway.
2.1.2. Christian IV and the founding of the Company
In 1615, two Dutch merchants, Jan de Willem of Amsterdam and Herman Rosenkrantz of Rotterdam, brought before King Christian IV a proposal for the foundation of a Danish trading company that might compete with the EIC and VOC, and in the process enrich both king and shareholders. The king was very receptive to the proposal, not least (one would assume) from a desire to mark the role of Denmark-Norway as a major player in contemporary European trade and politics.
On March 17th, 1616, Christian IV issued a charter , giving the Danish East India Company a monopoly on trade between Denmark and Asia for a period of 12 years. The company structure was a partnership modelled on the Dutch company, and, in fact, several of the Articles of the company charter were translated directly from the Dutch. Proportional shares in the company capital might be purchased by anyone, though a minimum share price of 150 rixdollars was established. Several years were to pass, however, before the necessary initial capital had been gathered . It would seem that there was a lack of confidence in the prospects of the company, among potential Danish investors. It was not until 1618 that sufficient funds had been collected to finance an expedition.
Apparently, the original intention of the expedition planners had been that the destination of the first venture would be the Coromandel coast of India, a region suggested by one of the company's advisors, Roelant Crappé , a Dutchman formerly in the service of the VOC in Asia. About this time, however, another Dutchman named Marselis de Boschouwer appeared, purporting to be an emissary from the "Emperor of Ceylon", a potentate who offered favourable trade conditions to any European nations capable of aiding him against the portuguese, who were at the time making inroads into his domain. In November 1617, Boschouwer was given audience with the king, a meeting that resulted in a "Treaty of Aid and Trade" between Denmark and the "Emperor", signed in March 1618 . The plans were hastily redrawn, the destination of the expedition now being Ceylon.
Whether or not Boschouwer was acting in good faith, or he was just a skillful confidence man, is open to discussion. There is certainly a lot of evidence to suggest that he deliberately exaggerated his own importance on Ceylon, as well as that of the "Emperor" (in reality the rajah, king, of Kandy).
2.1.3. The first expedition and the colonization of Tranquebar
Long before the expeditionary fleet was ready to sail, the ship Øresund was outfitted and ready. It was decided that she be sent ahead to scout out the region, and on August 18, 1618, she sailed for the East Indies under the command of Roelant Crappé. Later the same year, on November 29, the main expeditionary fleet, consisting of 4 Danish ships and 1 Dutch escort, sailed from the roadstead of Copenhagen. In command was 24-year-old Ove Gjedde, later to become grand admiral of the Royal Danish Navy.
The journey east was not without excitement; on Febuary 19, 1619, the expedition encountered three French ships off Cape Verde. Taking them for pirates (this may or may not have been the case), the Danish fleet engaged them in a brief battle, which resulted in the sinking of one hostile ship, and the capture of the other two as prize ships . Thus reinforced, the fleet continued around Africa, arriving at Ceylon in May 1620.
In the intervening time, Øresund had arrived at Ceylon. After negotiations with rajah Senarat of Kandy (the "Emperor"), Crappé began to harass portuguese shipping in the area. The portuguese, however, offered strong resistance, and sank Øresund and captured Crappé. Upon his transfer to the portuguese trading post at Negapatnam, Crappé was turned over to the nayak of Tanjore (or Tanjavur), the local potentate under whose jurisdiction Negapatnam was.
While this was taking place, Ove Gjedde had arrived at Ceylon, negotiating with rajah Senarat for the right to construct a fortress at Trincomalee on the east coast of the island. Construction of the fortress was begun, but little ever came of it.
Boschouwer had died on the long and arduous trip from Europe (high death rates were common on East India ventures of the time), immediately before the arrival at Ceylon. It was thus not possible to hold him responsible for his more-or-less exaggerated description of the "Emperor's" power and his own authority .
With the unsatisfactory developments on Ceylon, Gjedde now decided to sail to the Coromandel coast, and in October 1620 he arrived at the court of the nayak of Tanjore. By November 20, 1620, a treaty had been concluded between the nayak and the King of Denmark, by which the Danes were given permission to erect a fortress at the village of Tranquebar (or Tarangambadi) .
Gjedde briefly returned to Ceylon, where the work on fortifying Trincomalee was languishing. Ceylon did not show any great promise as a trading site, so he decided to abandon any further efforts at establishing a presence on the island. In 1622, Gjedde returned to Denmark, leaving Tranquebar in the hands of Roelant Crappé.
The first couple of years seem to have been hard ones for the Danes at Tranquebar; Dutch company documents  indicate that the Danes had to sell off some of their artillery pieces. The fledgling colony's trading efforts seem also to have been hampered by shipwrecks (a misfortunate tendency that continues to plague the Danish efforts in India for many years).
2.2. A trading venture, for good or bad (1620 - 1640)
During 1621, the Danes began what was to be their main occupation in Tranquebar for years to come; the ship København was sent from Tranquebar to Tenasserim (or Mergui) on the west coast of Thailand, whence a load a malayan pepper was freighted to Tranquebar. Later, in 1624, a route to and from Macassar (in present-day Indonesia) was established, tending mostly to the trade in cloves. With these two routes, the Danes, over the course of the following decades, became part of the intra-Asian network of trade, the so-called country trade, a role that was to prove of great significance to the colony .
After 1625, the Danes ceased trading for themselves on the Tranquebar-Tenasserim route; instead, portuguese goods was carried, and the Danish ships thus functioned as neutral third parties in the comprehensive trading network that criss-crossed the Bay of Bengal. This procedure was also adopted on the trade route to Macassar .
In 1625, a factory was also established at Masulipatnam, the most important emporium in the region, and lesser trading offices were established at Pipli and Balasore.
Despite all this activity, the colony was in poor financial straits. In 1627, only three ships were left to the Danes, and in the same year Roelant Crappé was unable to pay the agreed-upon tribute to the nayak. During 1628 and 1629, Crappé negotiated with the VOC, proposing to hand over Tranquebar to the Dutch company, but the VOC was not amenable to the proposal. An agreement was made, however, for Dutch support in the garrisoning of the fort .
In 1636, it was Crappé's turn to go home to Denmark, leaving the government of the colony to the Dutchman Barent Pessart, an "intelligent, but most unreliable man"  who had formerly been a private merchant (vrijburger), licensed by the VOC to trade within Asia. Pessart rapidly made a mess of the colony accounts, and made several high-risk deals. By 1638, Pessart's personal debts in Masulipatnam alone amounted to 35800 pagodas, at an interest of 2.5 to 3 percent per month, and Pessart and his family were being held hostage for payment of the debts of the Danes .
Meanwhile, in Copenhagen, the ailing financial state of the company led to an effort, in 1638, by the major stockholders to persuade the king to dissolve the company, a proposal that was rebuffed by Christian IV .
In 1639, to ships sailed from Denmark for Tranquebar, Christianshavn and Solen. These were to be the last ships from Denmark for the next 29 years. Solen arrived at Tranquebar in 1640, but Christianshavn suffered a prolonged and unwilling detention at the Canary Islands , and did not arrive before 1643. Aboard Christianshavn was Willem Leyel, designated the new leader of the colony by the company directors in Copenhagen.
Immediately subsequent to her arrival in 1640, Solen seized a ship belonging to Mir Muhammad Sayyid Ardestani, a wealthy merchant of Golconda , and Pessart and his family were released in exchange for its return. .
2.3. "No ship for Tranquebar" (1640 - 1669)
In September 1643, after many tribulations, Willem Leyel finally arrived in India. Pessart, who must have felt the place getting too hot for him, denied Leyel access to Dansborg, the fortress at Tranquebar, shutting the gates and refusing to hand over his books. It was only when Leyel began to besiege the citadel (with aid from the native community leaders of Tranquebar), that Pessarts people allowed the gates to be opened. Pessart himself had fled in a portuguese ship, taking with him the fort's best guns, the money, and the books .
Leyel's efforts to reestablish the credit-rating of the Danes (and pay off the debts incurred under Pessart) in the region were hampered by the lack of the books. The disordered state of affairs with regard to trade with Golconda continued, and Leyel was forced to declare war. After a blockade of Masulipatnam and privateering ventures leading to the capture of golcondian ships, the parties agreed to a peaceful settlement .
Golconda was not, however, the only regional power that fell afoul of Danish privateers. Around 1640, som Danish ships had stranded on the coast near Pipli in the Bengal. The local authorities (subjects of the Mogul empire) refused to help the Danes, and confiscated the ships' cargoes. From the point of view of the Danes, this was interpreted as common robbery, and was to be the start of three decades of privateering warfare by the Danes against Bengal shipping. Consequent to the Danish privateering, the other European companies experienced certain diplomatic difficulties with the Mogul empire, inasmuch as the latter decided to lump all "Christians" together and made the Dutch and British responsible for the Danish attacks .
Leyel was not, however, to be in charge of the colony for very long; in 1648, a number of his officers led a succesful mutiny against him. Their grievance was apparently dissatisfaction with the peace treaty Leyel had signed with the Moguls, a treaty that effectively put a stop to their lucrative privateering activities. The leader of the mutiny was the former head of the factory in Macassar, Poul Hansen Korsør; he had Leyel imprisoned, and confiscated his treasury. After a while Leyel was released, returning home to Denmark. Poul Hansen Korsør resumed privateering, and did not seem particularly discerning, as far as the precise nationality of the prizes taken. Thus, several ships were "assumed" to be hostile ships from Bengal, albeit they were of obviously neutral nationality .
In the same year as the mutiny, in 1648, King Christian IV died, and Frederik III became king of Denmark. The Danish East India Company was at the time more or less bankrupt, and there was no sign of a resumption of contact with Tranquebar in the immediate future. The wars in Europe during King Christian's time, and the ongoing warfare with Sweden, meant that the Crown had better things to do with its ships than to send them on year-long journeys to Asia. In 1650, the king, at the behest of the major shareholders, dissolved the company. Some attempts were made to sell Tranquebar to the Elector of Brandenburg, but payment was not made as agreed, so the deal fell through .
Simultaneously with this, Poul Hansen Korsør seems to have made attempts at turning over Tranquebar to the Dutch, in return for a guarantee that the fort would be restored to the King of Denmark at a later point in time .
In the years after the arrival of the last ship from Denmark, Christianshavn, the number of Danes in the colony shrank. Conditions in India were unhealthy for Europeans, and some desertions seem to have taken place. In order to bolster the dwindling Danish force, portuguese and portuguese-indian natives were hired to help garrison the fort, and they soon made up the majority of the colony's military strength.
At the time of Poul Hansen Korsør's death, in 1655, the colony's Danish population was very small, and the man chosen to succeed him was a commoner, chief gunner Eskild Andersen Kongsbakke, a man of commoner stock from Halland (in present-day Sweden). The choice of the baseborn and almost illiterate Kongsbakke, across all contemporary class barriers, was to prove a wise one, however. Shortly afterwards, Kongsbakke became the last surviving Dane in Tranquebar.
The nayak of Tanjore had, by this time, had enough of the continued failure of the Danes to provide tribute. In 1655, he sent an armed force towards Tranquebar. With a defence carefully orchestrated by Kongsbakke and supported by the local natives, the colony managed to withstand the siege. After a while, the siege was lifted, although no peace was made.
Over the following years, Tranquebar was several times besieged, but the fort continued to hold out. In 1660, Kongsbakke let a wall be built around the town of Tranquebar, the easier to protect it .
In the years under Kongsbakke, the privateering activities in the Bay of Bengal proceeded apace. Ships from Bengal continued to be seized as prizes and their cargoes sold. The money was wisely invested by the canny Kongsbakke, in repairing the fort, Dansborg, and in amassing a rather large treasury (19000 pagodas in 1658) .
Apparently, Kongsbakkes loyalty to Denmark was somewhat more heartfelt than that of his predecessor, possibly because he was the sole remaining Dane. At any rate, he initially sent several reports back to Denmark, by ships of other European nations, although only one actually arrived in Copenhagen (in 1656). Some time later, however, he managed to send more regular reports (1662-1665). In Copenhagen, these (very optimistic) reports were regarded with some skepticism.
Tranquebar was besieged again, this time for nine months, but at last Kongsbakke managed to negotiate a settlement with the nayak. Once again, the colony had survived. It was painfully evident to Kongsbakke, though, that it could not continue doing so indefinitely. Thus, in 1668, he sent an emissary to Copenhagen - Geert van Hagen, a Dutch sergeant from the Dutch colony at Negapatnam. His verbal account, and Kongsbakkes written report, made the difference: later that year, the Danish governement sent the frigate Færø to India, commanded by Capt. Sivardt Adelaer and carrying a group of soldiers under Henrik Eggers.
The ship arrived at Trankebar in May 1669, and for Tranquebar, 29 years of isolation were at an end. Eskild Andersen Kongsbakke received the King's notice of his formal appointment as colony leader, in cooperation with Adelaer and Eggers .
2.4 Epilogue: The fate of Eskild Andersen Kongsbakke,
and the second Danish East India Company (1670 - 1729)
In 1670, trade with Tranquebar had been resumed, and the economic prospects of Denmark in Asia seemed to be in for a boom period. A decision was made to found a new company, which received a royal charter for a period of 40 years, on November 20, 1670. The Danish expedition on the Færø had also carried an emissary to the nayak of Tanjore, and the peace that Kongsbakke had agreed upon was ratified in the form of a new decree, expanding the Danish colony with three more villages in the environs of Trankebar. New trade routes to Bantam and the Sunda Islands were set up, and in 1673 a delegation was sent to Bengal to negotiate an end to the ongoing state of war, concluding a peace treaty the following year.
In Tranquebar, Eskild Andersen Kongsbakke, who had done so much for the colony, was gradually pushed aside. Henrik Eggers and his officers had little use for the poorly-educated Kongsbakke, and his marriage to a native woman was a further stumbling-block. Kongsbakke finally died, in 1674, and was buried in Tranquebar (the precise whereabouts of his grave are no longer known) .
The second company enjoyed a reasonable success, and in connection with the favourable conditions for overseas trade following the peace at Rijswijk in 1698, Christian V extended the company's charter for another 40 years. The Great Northern War, unfortunately, caused serious losses to the company, and by the time peace was made in 1720, the company's economy was ailing. In 1726, Frederik IV chose to refuse a request for aid, and the shareholders had to dissolve the second company in April 1729 .
3. Concluding remarks
When considering Tranquebar and the first Danish East India Company, one must be aware of a few important facts. First and foremost, that the first Danish company never was a business comparable in size to the British or Dutch companies. When Sanjay Subrahmanyam compares the Danish company of 1636 to a private portuguese mercantile enterprise, he has an excellent point . At no time was the first Danish company able to dominate or monopolize trade in a region, the way that the portuguese, the Dutch and the British did. Too, the administration of company interests in Asia can, even in the most favourable interpretation, best be described as governed by chance.
The many shipwrecks plagueing the Danes, the continuing strife with the nayak of Tanjore and with the Moguls, and also the leadership struggles, first with Leyel and Pessart, and later with the mutiny - all these contributed to a disorderly and uncoordinated decision-making process in the colony.
Also, it should not be forgotten that the fairly small capital of the Danish company, compared to the huge sums invested in the other companies, must have presented a very real limiting factor. As Ole Feldbæk points out, the continued existence of Tranquebar is probably largely due to the Danish colony's status as a direct possession of the Danish monarch. Added to this is the fact that the Danish presence in the region, after all, was of little significance. Throughout the period 1618-1639, only 18 ships sailed from Copenhagen to Asia, and only 7 ships returned, in 1622-1637, mostly carrying cloves, pepper and cotton yarn . Compare these 18 ships with the embarkations for Asia in approximately the same period, from England (105 ships sailed from London, from 1621 to 1640) and the Netherlands (299 ships, from 1621 to 1640) , and the insignificance of the Danish company is underlined.
Thus, the Danes neither presented a military or mercantile threat to the other European companies operating in Asia. While the initial events surrounding the arrival of the first Danish expedition did entail some clashes with portuguese ships, the portuguese power in the region was greatly diminished by the time of the long period of Tranquebar's isolation, when the colony might reasonably be considered to have been weakened and vulnerable, rendering the initial difficulties with the portuguese irrelevant. As concerns the British and Dutch, these seem to have lacked the will to evict the Danes from the region - presumably because the Danes were no real threat. At no time in the existence of the first company did it show reliable profit, and the company's debts accumulated steadily until its dissolution.
The intra-Asiatic trade, the so-called country trade, in which the company took part, trading pepper and cloves and freighting portuguese goods to and from Tenasserim and Macassar, was a a different matter. That the Danes acted as neutral third parties in local trading, and took part in the regional trading structure on a par with local merchants, was doubtless of great importance to the continued viability, such as it was, of the Danish colony.
To modern readers, the privateering wars with Golconda and the Mogul Empire are without a doubt the oddest part of Tranquebar's history. That this diminutive Danish fortress (with only one Dane left, at the end) could pursue an effective and profitable privateering "business" in the Bay of Bengal may be taken as a sign of these Indian countries' lack of expertise in naval warfare, when compared with a European nation. One should, in this context, remember that prior to the European advent, the Indian Ocean was effectively free of naval warfare. The Mogul Empire's attempts to make the other European companies responsible for the piratical Danes bears witness to the Moguls' own lack of ability to remedy the problem.
In the final analysis, the Danish company is parenthetical to the history of Asian-European interaction. The most significant aspect of this historical parenthesis is to be found in the very durability of an unsupported European colony, in the face of local hostility, mutiny, disease and 29 years of isolation. This was and is a fascinating and impressive achievement.
 FURBER, HOLDEN: Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient 1600-1800 (Minneapolis 1976), p. 41. (back)
 The complete text of the charter may be found (in Danish) in FELDBÆK, OLE: Danske Handelskompagnier 1616-1843. Oktrojer og interne ledelsesregler. (Copenhagen 1986). (back)
 LARSEN, KAY: De Dansk-Ostindiske Koloniers Historie. Trankebar. (Copenhagen 1907), pp. 13-14. Larsen also tells of King Christian IV's rather shameless "suggestion" to employees of the court that they invest a portion of their salaries in the enterprise. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 14. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 14-15. See also: SUBRAHMANYAM, SANJAY: The Coromandel Trade of the Danish East India Company, 1618-1649. Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, 1989, pp. 43-44. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 16-17. Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op.cit., p. 44. See also a letter from Andries Soury in Masulipatnam to the VOC directors, May 23, 1621, cited in PRAKASH, OM: The Dutch Factories in India 1617-1623 (New Delhi 1984), pp.162-163. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 17. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 20. Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op.cit., p. 45. The text of the firman (decree) issued by the nayak is quoted in extenso (in Danish), in an appendix to Larsen's book, pp. 167-169. (back)
 Om Prakash: Dutch Factories, op.cit., pp. 166-167. (back)
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op. cit., pp. 45-47. See also: FOSTER, WILLIAM: The English Factories in India 1622-1623 (Oxford 1908; 2. bind af 13), p. 337. (back)
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op. cit., p. 47. (back)
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op. cit., p. 49. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 30. (back)
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op. cit., pp. 52-53. Subrahmanyam points out that the Danish activity on the Coromandel coast at the time of Crappé's departure in 1636 is atypical for the great European trading companies of the time; he compares it to a private portuguese merchant house. (back)
 FELDBÆK, OLE: The Organization and Structure of the Danish East India, West India and Guinea Companies in the 17th and 18th Centuries. In: BLUSSÉ, L. & GAASTRA, F. (eds.): Companies and Trade. pp. 135-158 (Leiden 1981), p. 140. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p.30-31. See also: FELDBÆK, OLE: No Ship for Tranquebar for Twenty-nine Years. Or: The Art of Survival of a Mid-Seventeenth Century European Settlement in India. In: PTAK, RODERICH and ROTHERMUND, DIETMAR (red.): Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750 (Stuttgart 1991), pp. 31-32. (back)
 Mir Muhammad Sayyid Ardestani, also known as Mir Jumla, is a key figure in 17th century India. See, among others: SARKAR, CH. JAGADISH NARAYAN: The Life of Mir Jumla, the General of Aurangzeb (New Delhi 1979) and SUBRAHMANYAM, SANJAY: Persians, Pilgrims and Portuguese: The Travails of Masulipatnam Shipping in the Western Indian Ocean, 1590-1665. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 3, 1988. (back)
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op. cit., p. 53. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 32-34, and Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., pp. 31-32. Pessarts flight was not the end of his troubles. The unfortunate man let himself be enticed by the Dutch into making an expedition to Manila, where he was slain by the locals. On the whole, Pessart seems to have lacked common sense. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 36. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 36-40, and Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., pp. 34-36. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 37-38, and Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., pp. 34-35. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 38; Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., p.34-35; Sanjay Subrahmanyam: Coromandel Trade, op.cit., p. 55. (back)
 FOSTER, WILLIAM: The English Factories in India 1651-1654 (Oxford 1915; vol. 9 of 13), pp. 218-219. Letter from the factors at Bantam to the British Company, dated December 20, 1653: "Pawells Hanseene [Poul Hansen Korsør], the Danish chief at Tranquebar, has offered to deliver that fort to the Dutch, on condition that the latter pay the debts of the Danes on that coast, and should undertake to restore that place to the King of Denmark on demand". (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 38-39; Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., pp. 32-33. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 39. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., pp. 39-40; Ole Feldbæk: No Ship for Tranquebar, op.cit., p. 36. (back)
 Kay Larsen: Trankebar, op.cit., p. 39. (back)
 Ole Feldbæk: Danske Handelskompagnier 1616-1843. Oktrojer og interne Ledelsesregler , op.cit. (back)
 Se note . (back)
 FELDBÆK, OLE: Den danske Asienhandel 1616-1807; Værdi og Volumen. Historisk Tidsskrift, Bd. 90, Hft. 2. (København 1990), pp. 320-324. (back)
 STEENSGAARD, NIELS: The growth and composition of the long-distance trade of England and the Dutch Republic before 1750. In: TRACY, JAMES D.: The Rise of Merchant Empires. Cambridge University Press, U.S.A., 1990, p. 109. (back)